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1. Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis has not only shed doubts on the proper functioning of 
conventional “Western” banking, but has also increased the attention on Islamic banking, as 
some observers have pointed to their superior performance during the crisis (Hasan and Dridi, 
2010). Academics and policy makers alike point to the advantages of Sharia-compliant financial 
products, as the mismatch of short-term, on-sight demandable deposit contracts with long-term 
uncertain loan contracts is mitigated with equity and risk-sharing elements. In addition, Sharia-
compliant products are very attractive for segments of the population that demand financial 
services that are consistent with their religious beliefs. While Sharia-compliant financial assets 
still constitute only a fraction of total global banking assets (1.5%), their importance has been 
increasing rapidly, and not only in Islamic countries, as between 2006 and 2011, total assets in 
Sharia-compliant financial institutions have doubled to USD 900 billion (Financial Times, 2011). 
In addition, Islamic financial institutions have a relatively high market share in several emerging 
markets, such as Malaysia and several Middle Eastern countries. However, little academic 
evidence exists on the functioning of Islamic banks, as of yet. 
This paper compares the business model, efficiency, asset quality, and stability of Islamic 
and conventional banks, using an array of indicators constructed from balance sheet and income 
statement data across a sample of 22 countries with both Islamic and conventional banks. In 
addition, we gauge the relative performance of both bank groups during local banking crises and 
the recent global financial crisis.  Our paper thus sheds light on an important debate. While 
proponents of Sharia-compliant financial services point to clear differences in business models of 
Islamic and conventional banks and to higher efficiency and stability of Islamic banks, critics 
argue that (i) conventional and Islamic banks might be different in form but are similar in 
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substance and/or (ii) Islamic banks do not have any advantages in efficiency and stability 
(Kuran, 2004).  
In theory, Islamic finance differs significantly from conventional finance. Specifically, 
Sharia-compliant finance does not allow for the charging of interest payments (riba), as only 
goods and services are allowed to carry a price, does not allow for speculation, and prohibits 
financing of specific illicit activities.  At the same time, Sharia-compliant finance relies on the 
idea of profit- and loss- and thus risk-sharing, on both the liability and asset side and posits that 
all transactions have to be backed by a real economic transaction that involves a tangible asset. 
This would suggest clear differences in funding and activity structures of Islamic and 
conventional banks.   In practice, however, Islamic scholars have developed products that 
resemble conventional banking products, replacing interest rate payments and discounting with 
fees and contingent payment structures. Chong and Liu (2009), for example, find that in 
Malaysia only a small portion of Islamic bank financing is based on profit-loss sharing and that 
Islamic deposits are not interest-free, but closely pegged to conventional deposits, a finding 
confirmed by Khan (2010b) for a sample of large Islamic banks across several countries.  In 
addition, leasing-like products are popular among Islamic banks, as they are directly linked to 
real-sector transactions. Nevertheless, the residual equity-style risk that Islamic banks and their 
depositors are taking has implications for the agency relationships on both sides of the balance 
sheet as we will discuss below. We will test whether differences in the business model are 
reflected in indicators of income and funding structure as well as intermediation efficiency. 
Theory does not make clear predictions whether Islamic banks should be more cost-
effective or more stable than conventional banks. On the one hand, the equity-like nature of 
savings and investment deposits might increase depositors‟ incentives to monitor and discipline 
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the bank. At the same token, the equity-like nature of deposits might distort the bank‟s incentives 
to monitor and discipline borrowers as they do not face the threat by depositors of immediate 
withdrawal, while it increases the overall riskiness of assets. In addition, Sharia restrictions tend 
to increase asset concentration and limit the use of hedging instruments for banks.  A similar 
ambiguity relates to the efficiency of Islamic banks. On the one hand, monitoring and screening 
costs might be lower for Islamic banks given the lower agency problems.  On the other hand, the 
higher complexities of Islamic banking might result in higher costs and thus lower efficiency of 
Islamic banks. Further, the younger age of Islamic banks compared to most conventional banks 
might imply higher cost structures. 
We use a sample of Islamic and conventional banks over the period 1995 to 2009 to 
assess whether there are significant differences between conventional and Islamic banks.  
Focusing on a sample of countries with both types of banks allows us to control for unobserved 
time-variant country-specific effects, thus a clearer identification of such differences than when 
comparing banks from different countries.  We find no significant differences in business 
orientation (as measured by the share of fee-based to total income or the share of non-deposit in 
total funding). In contrast, we find that Islamic banks are less cost-effective than conventional 
banks, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and higher capital-asset ratios, 
suggesting a more conservative approach to risk-taking. The differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks are more prominent for smaller Islamic banks.  Further, we find significant 
cross-country variation, with the differences in intermediation ratio, cost efficiency, asset quality 
and capitalization between Islamic and conventional banks driven by a few countries. In 
addition, this variation is partly due to the difference in the market share of Islamic banks in 
these countries which is likely to reflect the different levels of maturity, sophistication and 
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competitive behavior of these banks. Considering the performance of Islamic and conventional 
banks during crisis periods, we find that Islamic banks are better capitalized, have higher asset 
quality and are less likely to disintermediate during crises. We also find a relatively better stock 
market performance of Islamic banks during the recent crisis, again possibly due to their higher 
capitalization, and better asset quality.  
This paper contributes to a small but growing literature on Islamic finance. While there is 
a large practitioner literature on Islamic finance, in general, and specifically Islamic banking, 
there are few academic papers up to now.
1
 Cihak and Hesse (2010) find that small Islamic banks 
are more stable than small conventional banks, with the reserve holding for large banks.
2
 Abdul-
Majid et al. (2010) find that the relative efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks varies 
significantly across countries. On the country level, Baele, Farooq and Ongena (2012) find lower 
defaults for Islamic than for conventional loans even among the same borrower and same bank in 
Pakistan, while Ongena and Sendeniz-Yuncu (2011) find for Turkey that Islamic banks mainly 
deal with young, multiple-bank, industry-focused and transparent firms. On the deposit side and 
also using a sample of Pakistani banks, Khan (2010a) finds Islamic banks enjoy substantially 
higher deposit growth rates than conventional banks and even benefited during the recent crisis 
in terms of higher deposit inflows.  Several authors have explored the relative efficiency of 
Islamic and conventional banks, such as El-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005) for Turkish banks and 
                                                          
1
 For one of the earliest academic contribution, see Bashir (1983), and for an early survey, see Zaher and Hassan 
(2001). 
2
 Abedifar, Molyneaux and Tarazi (2011) confirm these findings for small Islamic banks in a sample of countries 
with both Islamic and conventional banks. Turk-Ariss (2010) finds for a sample of 13 countries that Islamic banks 
are better capitalized but less competitive.  
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Srairi (2010) for banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council region.
3
 This general dearth of academic 
work on Islamic finance stands in contrast with the increasing importance that Islamic banking 
has in many Muslim countries in Asia and in Africa. With this paper we hope to contribute to the 
emerging literature on this topic. Unlike previous papers, we focus on multiple dimensions along 
which theory predicts that conventional and Islamic banks differ. Unlike previous papers, we 
carefully control for omitted variable bias and we explicitly gauge the relative performance of 
Islamic banks during the recent crisis.  
This being one of the first bank-level explorations of Islamic banks, two important 
caveats are in place. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that there are significant differences 
across countries in terms of how Sharia-compliant products are exactly structured, with some of 
the banks basically offering conventional products repackaged as Sharia-compliant products.  
This implies that we need to exercise caution when interpreting Islamic banking in the context of 
traditional models of financial intermediation. In addition, there are differences across different 
Muslim countries in what is considered Sharia-compliant and what is not, which makes it 
difficult to do cross-country comparisons. Our finding of significant cross-country variation in 
differences between Islamic and conventional banks supports this assessment. Second, given the 
different nature of conventional and Sharia-compliant products, as discussed in section 2, 
balance sheet and income statement items might not be completely comparable across bank types 
even within the same country.
4
    
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents some of the basic 
Sharia-compliant products and links these products to the theoretical literature on financial 
                                                          
3
 Among other papers, Olson and Zoubi (2008) show that financial ratios allow discriminating between conventional 
and Islamic banks among financial institutions in the Gulf Cooperation Council region.  
4
 See Karim (2001) for a discussion on varying accounting practices across countries with Islamic banks. 
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intermediation.  Section 3 presents data and methodology. Section 4 uses bank-level data to 
assess the relative business orientation, efficiency, asset quality and stability of Islamic and 
conventional banks.  Section 5 compares the relative performance of conventional and Islamic 
banks during crisis periods and section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Sharia-compliant products and agency problems 
There are five principles that differentiate Islamic or Sharia5-compliant finance from 
conventional finance. On the one hand, there are the prohibition on riba (usury, which is 
generally defined as interest or excessive interest), the prohibition on gharar (risk or uncertainty, 
which is generally defined as speculation), and the prohibition on financing for illicit sectors 
(such as weapons, drugs, alcohol, and pork). On the other hand, there are the profit- and loss-
sharing principle and the principle that all transactions have to be backed by a real economic 
transaction that involves a tangible asset. In order for banks and their clients to comply with 
Sharia, over the past decades, specific products have been developed that avoid the concept of 
interest and imply a certain degree of risk-sharing.  
 One important feature is the pass-through of risk between depositor and borrower.  
Among the most common Islamic banking products are partnership loans between bank and 
borrowers, which are based strictly on profit-loss sharing.  Under the mudaraba contract, profits 
are shared at a predetermined ratio, while the losses are borne exclusively by the bank, i.e. the 
entrepreneur is covered by limited liability provisions. While the entrepreneur has the ultimate 
control over her business, major investment decisions, including the participation of other 
                                                          
5 
Sharia is the legal framework within which the public and private aspects of life are regulated for those living in a 
legal system based on fiqh (Islamic principles of jurisprudence) and for Muslims living outside the domain. 
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investors, have to be approved by the bank.  The Musharaka contract, on the other hand, has the 
bank as one of several investors, with profits and losses being shared among all investors.  These 
partnership arrangements are mirrored on the deposit side, with investment accounts or deposits 
that do not imply a fixed, preset return but profit-loss sharing. Such investment deposits can be 
either linked to a bank‟s profit level or to a specific investment account on the asset side of a 
bank‟s balance sheet. Depositors thus turn from creditors of the bank to residual claimants.   
 Other Sharia-complaint financial products are not based on profit-loss sharing, such as 
the Murabaha contract, which resembles a leasing contract in conventional banking.  By 
involving the purchase of goods, it gets around the prohibition to make a return on money 
lending. As in leasing contracts, the bank buys an investment good on behalf of the client and 
then on-sells it to the client, with staggered payments and a profit margin in the form of a fee. 
Similarly, operating leases (Ijarah) where the bank keeps ownership of the investment good and 
rents it to the client for a fee are feasible financial transactions under Sharia-law. While the 
discounting of IOUs and promissory notes is not allowed under Sharia-law as it would involve 
indirect interest rate payments, a similar structure can be achieved by splitting such an operation 
into two contracts, with full payment of the amount of the IOU on the one hand, and a fee or 
commission for this pre-payment, on the other hand.  
 On the deposit side, one can distinguish between non-remunerated demand deposits 
(amanah or qard), seen as depositors‟ loans to the bank– thus similar to demand deposits in 
many conventional banks around the world – and savings deposits that do not carry an interest 
rate, but participate in the profits of the bank. However, according to some Islamic scholars, 
banks are allowed to pay regular bonuses on such accounts. Investment accounts, finally, as 
discussed above, mirror the partnership loans on the asset side, by being fully involved in the 
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profit-loss-risk sharing arrangements of Islamic banks. So, the funding contains both funds for 
which Islamic banks are directly responsible as well as funds which they manage on behalf of the 
investors. 
In summary, while some of the products offered by Islamic banks are the same as in 
conventional banks (demand deposits) and others are structured in similar ways as conventional 
products (leasing products), there is a strong element of risk-sharing in Islamic banking.  How do 
these products fit with the traditional picture of a bank as financial intermediary? Transaction 
costs and agency problems between savers and entrepreneurs have given rise to banks in the first 
place, as they can economize on the transaction costs and mitigate agency conflicts.   Banks face 
agency problems on both sides of their balance sheet, with respect to their depositors whose 
money they invest in loans and other assets and where the bank acts effectively as agent of 
depositors, and on the asset side where borrowers (as agent) use depositors‟ resources for 
investment purposes.  The debt contract with deterministic monitoring (in case of default) 
(Diamond, 1984) or stochastic monitoring (Townsend, 1979) has been shown to be optimal for 
financial intermediation between a large number of savers and a large number of entrepreneurs. 
In addition, however, banks face the maturity mismatch between deposits, demandable on sight, 
and long-term loans, which can result in bank runs and insolvency (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  
Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue that it is exactly the double agency problems banks face, with 
depositors monitoring banks, that disciplines banks in turn to monitor borrowers, while 
government interventions such as deposit insurance distort such equilibrium.  
How does the risk-sharing component of Islamic banking affect these agency problems?  
On the one hand, the equity-like nature of savings and investment deposits might increase 
depositors‟ incentives to monitor and discipline the bank. At the same token, the equity-like 
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nature of deposits might distort the bank‟s incentives to monitor and discipline borrowers as it 
does not face the threat by depositors of immediate withdrawal.  Similarly, the equity-like 
character of partnership loans can reduce the necessary discipline imposed on entrepreneurs by 
debt contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  On the other hand, the equity character of banks‟ 
asset-side of the balance sheet and thus higher risk might also increase the uncertainty on 
depositors‟ return and increase the likelihood of both uninformed and informed bank runs.   This 
is exacerbated by the restrictions that banks face on terminating partnership loans or restricting 
them in their maturity.  
Practitioners and academics alike, however, have observed that in reality most Islamic 
products are not based on profit-loss sharing but resemble very much debt instruments. Aggarwal 
and Yousef (2000) and Khan (2010b) explain this as a rational response by Islamic banks to the 
weak contractual framework prevalent in most countries with Islamic banks, which call for debt-
like rather than equity-like instruments.  
 What do the different characteristics of Islamic and conventional banks imply for their 
relative business orientation, efficiency, asset quality, and stability?  Take first business 
orientation; the Sharia-compliant nature of Islamic bank products implies a different business 
model for Islamic banks that should become obvious from banks‟ balance sheets and income 
statements. We consider three aspects: the relative shares of interest and non-interest revenue, 
the relative importance of retail and wholesale funding, and the loan-deposit ratio.   On the one 
hand, there might be a higher share of non-interest revenue in Islamic banks as these banks might 
charge higher fees and commissions to compensate for the lack of interest revenue.  On the other 
hand, the share of revenue related to non-lending and including investment bank activities should 
be significantly lower for Islamic bank.  The overall implications for the relative share of interest 
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and non-interest revenues in total earnings are therefore a priori ambiguous. Similarly, in terms 
of retail vs. wholesale funding, there is a priori no clear difference, as Islamic banks can rely on 
market funding as much as conventional banks, as long as it is Sharia-compliant. Similarly, the 
difference in loan-deposit ratios across bank types is not clear a priori. On the one hand, profit-
loss-sharing accounts might not be characterized as loans on Islamic banks‟ balance sheets; on 
the other hand, Islamic banks face higher restrictions on investing in non-real sector related 
securities and thus might focus more on lending or lending-like business.   
 In terms of efficiency, it is a priori ambiguous whether conventional or Islamic banks 
should be more efficient. On the one hand, monitoring and screening costs might be lower for 
Islamic banks given the lower agency problems.  On the other hand, the higher complexities of 
Islamic banking might result in higher costs and thus lower efficiency of Islamic banks.
6
 Further, 
the younger age of Islamic banks compared to most conventional banks might imply higher cost 
structures. 
Differences in asset quality across Islamic and conventional banks are also, a priori, 
ambiguous, as it is not clear whether the tendency towards equity-funding in Islamic banks 
provides stronger incentives to adequately assess and monitor risk and discipline borrowers. 
Similarly, the relationship between bank type and bank stability is a priori ambiguous. On the 
one hand, the pass-through role and risk-sharing arrangements of Islamic banks might be a risk-
reducing factor.  Specifically, interest rate risk – well known feature of any risk management tool 
and stress test of a conventional bank - should be absent from an Islamic bank. In addition, 
adverse selection and moral hazard concerns might be reduced in Islamic banks if, as discussed 
                                                          
6
 See, for example, Ebrahim and Rahman (2005) for difficulties in structuring future and forward contracts under 
Sharia law, and Derigs and Marzban (2009) for difficulties in constructing Shariah-compatible asset portfolios.  
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above, depositors have stronger incentives to monitor and discipline. Further, Islamic banks can 
be assumed to be more stable than conventional banks, as they are not allowed to participate in 
risky trading activities, as discussed above.   This, however, also points to the importance of 
controlling for the importance of non-lending activities in conventional banks. On the other 
hand, the profit-loss financing increases the overall risk on banks‟ balance sheet as they take 
equity in addition to debt risk. In addition, the equity-like nature of financing contracts might 
actually undermine a bank‟s stability as it reduces market discipline (Diamond and Rajan, 2001).  
Further, operational risk aspects might be higher in Islamic banks stemming from the 
complexities of Sharia law and including legal and compliance risks.  Finally, the restrictions of 
Islamic banks to certain asset classes, the limited use of hedging instruments and the lack of 
high-quality liquid assets such as Sharia-compliant government bonds can also increase the 
riskiness of Sharia-compliant financial institutions. In a nutshell, it is a priori not clear whether 
Islamic or conventional banks are more or less stable than conventional banks.  
Summarizing, theory does not provide clear answers whether and how the business 
orientation, cost efficiency, asset quality, and stability differ between conventional and Islamic 
banks. Some of these differences might also vary according to bank size and thus possibilities to 
exploit scale economies and diversification tools. This ambiguity is exacerbated by lack of 
clarity whether the products of Islamic banks follow Sharia in form or in substance, an ambiguity 
which might vary across countries. We therefore turn to empirical analysis to explore differences 
between the two bank groups. During this analysis we will also explore differences across 
Islamic banks of different sizes and cross-country variation in the differences between Islamic 
and conventional banks. 
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3. Data and methodology 
 We use data from Bankscope, a global database with data on both listed and non-listed 
banks, to construct and compare indicators of business orientation, efficiency, asset quality, and 
stability of both conventional and Islamic banks.
7
 We only include banks with at least two 
observations and countries with data on at least four banks. Finally, we eliminate outliers in all 
variables by winsorizing at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles within each country. We also double 
check the categorization of Islamic banks in Bankscope with information from Islamic Banking 
Associations and country-specific sources.  
 We use a sample that comprises only countries with both conventional and Islamic banks, 
which allows us to control for any unobserved time-variant effect by introducing country-year 
dummies. Our main analysis over the period 1995 to 2009 includes 510 banks across 22 
countries, out of which 88 are Islamic banks. In addition, we use a sample of 209 listed banks 
across 21 countries for the period 2005 to 2009 to assess the impact of the global financial crisis 
on the relative stock market performance of Islamic and conventional banks. We will discuss this 
latter sample below in section 5. 
In Table 1, we present data on 22 countries with both conventional and Islamic banks. 
Specifically, we present the number of conventional and Islamic banks and note crisis periods. 
Several sample countries suffered banking crises during the sample period, including Indonesia 
between 1997 and 2001, Malaysia between 1997 and 1999, Turkey in 2000/2001, and Yemen in 
1996, in addition to the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2007 and affected the banking 
system directly in the UK.  We also present the market share of Islamic banks for 2007, the last 
                                                          
7
 We use unconsolidated data when available and consolidated if unconsolidated data are not available, in order not 
to double count subsidiaries of international banks.  
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year before the on-set of the Global Financial Crisis. The market share ranges from almost zero 
in the case of the UK to 41% in Kuwait.  Not included in this table are banking systems that are 
completely Islamic, such as Iran.  Almost half of all Islamic banks in these 22 countries are 
listed, which is a larger share than among conventional banks.   Table 2 presents descriptive 
statistics and univariate comparisons between conventional and Islamic banks. Specifically, we 
present mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum as well as average value for 
conventional and Islamic banks for each variable as well as the p-value of a two-sided t-test. We 
present descriptive statistics for the sample after winsorizing on the country-level, which still 
leaves us with some large outliers.  
 We use an array of different variables to compare Islamic and conventional banks. First, 
we compare the business orientation of conventional and Islamic banks, using two indicators 
suggested by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) as well as the traditional loan-deposit ratio. 
Specifically, we explore to which extent Islamic and conventional banks are involved in fee-
based business by using the ratio of fee-based to total operating income. In our sample, the share 
of fee-based income to total income varies from 5.7% to 68.2%, with an average of 33.4%. We 
also consider the importance of non-deposit funding to total funding, which ranges from zero to 
13.9% in our sample, with an average of 2.2%. The loan-to-deposit ratio varies from 17.8% to 
110.6%, with a mean of 62.5%.  Islamic banks have a significantly higher share of fee income 
than conventional banks, rely more on non-deposit funding and have higher loan-deposit ratios. 
These simple comparisons suggest that Islamic banks are less involved in traditional bank 
business – which relies heavily on interest-income generating loans and deposit funding – but 
intermediate more of the deposits they receive. 
14 
 
 Second, we use two indicators of bank efficiency. Overhead cost is our first and primary 
measure of bank efficiency and is computed as total operating costs divided by total assets.  
Overhead cost varies from less than 1% to 5.0% in our sample, with an average of 2.3%.  As 
alternative efficiency indicator, we use the cost-income ratio, which measures overhead costs 
relative to gross revenues, with higher ratios indicating lower levels of cost efficiency.  This 
indicator ranges from 1% to 714.3%, with an average of 41.9%. Islamic banks have significantly 
higher overhead costs than conventional banks, but only marginally higher cost-income ratios.
8
  
 Third, we use three indicators of asset quality. Specifically, we use (i) loss reserves, (ii) 
loan loss provisions, and (iii) non-performing loans, all scaled by gross loans. All indicators 
decrease in asset quality. We note that there might be problems with cross-country 
comparability, due to different accounting and provisioning standards. Loan loss reserves range 
from less than zero to 80.5%, with an average of 7.6%. Loan loss provisions range from less than 
zero to 4.1%, with a mean of 1.3%. Non-performing loans, finally, range for 0.6% to 29.3%, 
with an average of 9.3%. Islamic banks have significantly lower loan loss reserves and non-
performing loans, while there is no significant difference in loan loss provisions.    
Fourth, we use several indicators of bank stability. We use an indicator of maturity 
matching – the ratio of liquid assets to deposit and short-term funding to assess the sensitivity to 
bank runs. The liquidity ratio varies from zero to almost 900%, with a mean of 48.9%. We do not 
find any significant difference between Islamic and conventional banks. Further, we use the z-
score as measure of bank stability; this indicates the distance from insolvency, combining 
accounting measures of profitability, leverage and volatility, which has been widely used in the 
                                                          
8
 We do not use the net interest margin, a standard indicator of efficiency in the financial intermediation literature 
(Beck, 2007), as Sharia prohibits the use of interest and Islamic banks should therefore do not show any interest 
revenue or cost in their financial statements.  Nevertheless, Bankscope reports both for Islamic banks. 
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recent literature.
9
 Specifically, if we define insolvency as a state where losses surmount equity 
(E<-) (where E is equity,  is profits, A is total assets, ROA=/A is return on assets and CAR = 
E/A is the capital-asset ratio) the probability of insolvency can be expressed as prob(-
ROA<CAR). If profits are assumed to follow a normal distribution, it can be shown that z = 
(ROA+CAR)/SD(ROA) is the inverse of the probability of insolvency.
10
 Specifically, z indicates 
the number of standard deviations that a bank‟s return on assets has to drop below its expected 
value before equity is depleted and the bank is insolvent (see Roy, 1952; Hannan and Henwick, 
1988; Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993; and De Nicoló, 2000). Thus, a higher z-score indicates 
that the bank is more stable.  The z-score varies from four to 75 in our sample, with an average 
of 29. Islamic banks have a significantly lower z-score, suggesting that they are closer to 
insolvency than conventional banks.   
 We also consider two components of the z-score, most notably the return on assets and 
the capital-asset ratio. Return on assets varies from -40% to 30% across banks and over time, 
with an average of 1.2%, while the capital-asset ratio varies from 3.9% to 27.1% across banks 
and over the sample period, with an average of 11.9%. Islamic banks are significantly more 
profitable and better capitalized than conventional banks; however, since their z-scores are still 
lower, their returns also tend to be much more volatile.  
 While univariate comparisons show significant differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks, these differences could be driven by other bank or country characteristics. 
                                                          
9
 See, for example, Laeven and Levine (2008), Houston et al. (2010), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010). 
10
 We compute the standard deviation of ROA over the entire sample period. In robustness tests, we use a five-year 
rolling average of the standard deviation. Our regressions results, however, are not sensitive to this. 
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To assess differences in business model, efficiency, asset quality, and stability across different 
bank types, we therefore run the following regression: 
Banki,j,t =  + Bi,j,t + Cj*Yt + Ii  + i,t       (1) 
where Bank is one of our measures of business orientation, efficiency, asset quality, and stability 
of bank i in country j in year t, B is a vector of time-varying bank characteristics, Cj*Yt are 
country-year-fixed effects, I is a dummy taking the value one for Islamic banks and is a white-
noise error term. We thus compare Islamic and conventional banks within a country and a 
specific year. Below we also use additional specifications, including interacting the Islamic bank 
dummy with size dummies and with the market share of Islamic banks. We allow for clustering 
of the error terms on the bank level, i.e. correlation among the error terms across years within 
banks. We prefer to cluster on the bank- rather than country-level, as some of the countries in our 
sample host significantly more banks than others and we have only 22 countries. Simulations 
have shown that standard errors can be biased downwards in these two cases (Nichols and 
Schaffer, 2007).   
We control for an array of time-variant bank characteristics that might confound the 
relationship between bank type, on the one hand, and business orientation, asset quality, 
efficiency, and stability, on the other hand. Specifically, we control for bank size, using the log 
of total assets.  Larger banks might be more efficient due to scale economies, while the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between size and stability is ambiguous 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2006; Beck, 2008).  They might also be more likely to 
engage in fee-based business and have easier access to wholesale markets. We include the ratio 
of fixed assets to total assets to control for the opportunity costs that arise from having non-
earning assets on the balance sheet, as well as the share of non-interest earning assets to control 
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for non-lending business of banks, which previous research has shown to affect both efficiency 
and stability of banks (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2010). In our large sample, total assets vary from 2.2 million USD to 822 billion USD, with an 
average of 905 million USD. The share of fixed in total assets varies from close to zero to 
70.8%, with an average of 1.8%. The share of non-loan earning assets in total assets ranges from 
12% to 77%, with an average of 40%. Islamic banks are significantly smaller than conventional 
banks, have higher fixed assets, but lower non-interest earning assets. 
As discussed above, the concept of Sharia-compliant products and structure of Islamic 
banking varies significantly across countries. In a second step, we therefore assess for country-
specific differences between conventional and Islamic banks by introducing interaction terms 
between the Islamic bank dummy and the 22 country dummies: 
Banki,j,t =  + Bi,j,t + Cj*Yt + ∑j j Ii*Cj + i,t      (2) 
where the coefficients  j indicate the difference between conventional and Islamic banks for the 
respective country. We also offer several other sample splits, such as according to size of Islamic 
banks and according to the market share of Islamic banks, which we will explain in more detail 
below.  
In a third step, we compare Islamic and conventional banks with additional interactions 
for crisis periods.  Specifically, we introduce interaction terms of the Islamic bank dummy with a 
crisis dummy for local crises (Crisis) and a global financial crisis dummy (Global) that takes on 
the value one for the period 2007 to 2009. In addition, we interact the Islamic Bank dummy with 
a trend variable to distinguish between the effect of the crisis on any difference between Islamic 
and conventional banks and any longer time trends. 
Banki,j,t =  + Bi,j,t + Ci*Yt + Ii +Ii*Crisisi,t + Ii*Globalt + Ii*Trendt +  i,t  (3) 
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The coefficient estimates  and  will allow us to gauge whether there is any additional 
difference between Islamic and conventional banks during local banking crises or the global 
financial crisis and thus test the assertions made by commentators on the relative performance of 
Islamic banks during crisis periods and as discussed above.  
 
4. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks 
The results in Table 3 show that within countries and years, Islamic banks have higher 
loan-deposit ratios, higher cost-income ratios, higher overhead costs, lower non-performing 
loans and higher capital-asset ratios than conventional banks. Here, we compare Islamic and 
conventional banks, while only controlling for country-year specific effects, but not for other 
bank-level characteristics. So, without taking into account differences in size and asset structure, 
Islamic banks show higher intermediation efficiency, lower cost efficiency, lower non-
performing loans and higher capitalization.  The magnitude of these differences is also 
meaningful, with Islamic banks having an 8.7 percentage point higher loan-deposit ratio, a 9.9 
percentage point higher cost-income ratio, 0.3 percentage points higher overhead costs, 2.2 
percentage points lower non-performing loans and a 2.9 percentage point higher capital-asset 
ratio.  
The results in Table 4 confirm the findings of Table 3 of higher loan-deposit ratios, lower 
cost-efficiency, lower non-performing loans and higher capitalization of Islamic banks, though 
with lower statistical and economic significance.  Here, we control for bank size and asset 
structure of banks, by including the log of total assets, the share of non-loan earning assets in 
total assets and the share of fixed assets in total assets. We find that Islamic banks have a 3.5 
percentage point higher loan-deposit ratio and a 6.5 percentage point higher cost-income ratio, 
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while there is no significant difference in overhead costs, once we control for other bank 
characteristics. Islamic banks have 2.1 percentage points lower non-performing loans, a 
coefficient estimate, however, that is significant only at the 10%, as is the difference in the 
capital-asset ratio, which is 1.2 percentage points higher for Islamic banks.  
The other bank-level variables enter with the expected signs in the Table 4 regressions. 
Larger banks have lower overhead costs and cost-income ratios, lower loss reserves, lower 
liquidity, and lower profitability and capitalization ratios.  Banks with higher fixed assets rely 
more on deposit funding and have lower loan-deposit ratios, higher overhead, higher loan loss 
provisions, and higher z-scores due to higher capitalization ratios. Banks with a higher share of 
non-loan earning assets have lower loan-deposit ratios, lower overhead costs, higher loss 
reserves, loan loss provisions and non-performing loans, higher liquidity reserves, and higher z-
scores due to higher ROAs. 
We confirm our main findings with several robustness tests. First, we truncate our 
sample at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles rather than winsorizing at these thresholds.  Results, 
reported in Appendix Table A1 for this somewhat smaller sample, confirm that Islamic banks 
have higher cost-income ratios (though significant only at the 10% level), lower loan loss 
reserves and non-performing loans, and higher capital-asset ratios. Second, we limit the sample 
to the pre-crisis period 1995 to 2007 and again confirm several of our findings, including that of 
higher loan-deposit ratios, higher cost-income ratios, and higher capital-asset ratios for Islamic 
banks (Appendix Table A2). Third, we drop 18 banks, which are included in our sample both as 
parent and as subsidiary in different countries. Again, we confirm our findings, though at lower 
significance levels.  
20 
 
Table 5 shows that there are significant differences between Islamic banks of different 
sizes and that many of the findings so far on differences between Islamic and conventional banks 
are driven by smaller Islamic banks. Here we split the sample of Islamic banks according to their 
asset size. Specifically, we split the sample into banks above the 75
th
 percentile, between the 25
th
 
and 75
th
 percentiles and banks below the 25
th
 percentile. As in Table 4, we include country-year 
fixed effects and bank-level control variables. Islamic banks might vary significantly across 
different size buckets. Smaller Islamic banks might be more affected by the higher cost 
inefficiency of Islamic banks as the design of Sharia-compliant products and compliance costs 
might involve scale economies. Similarly, the absence of risk diversification tools might affect 
smaller more than larger Islamic banks. Cihak and Hesse (2010) find significant differences in 
stability between small and large Islamic banks, with the former being more stable and the latter 
being less stable than conventional banks.  
The results in Table 5 show that large Islamic banks have higher cost-income ratios than 
conventional banks  and lower non-deposit funding (significant at the 10% level), while large 
Islamic banks do not differ from conventional banks along any of the other dimensions. 
Similarly, we find that mid-sized Islamic banks have higher loan-deposit ratios and lower non-
performing loans than conventional banks, while there is no difference between mid-sized 
Islamic and conventional banks along any of the other dimensions. Small Islamic banks, on the 
other hand, have higher loan-deposit ratios, lower non-performing loans, higher maturity match, 
and higher equity-asset ratios than conventional banks. We also find several significant 
differences between small and large Islamic banks. Specifically, smaller Islamic banks have 
higher non-deposit funding, higher loan-deposit ratios, lower non-performing loans, higher 
maturity match and higher equity-asset ratios than large Islamic banks. In summary, most of the 
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differences between Islamic and conventional banks are driven by smaller Islamic banks; in 
addition, there are significant differences between Islamic banks of different sizes.
11
 
While the results so far provide suggestive evidence of differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks in intermediation efficiency, cost efficiency, asset quality and capitalization, 
there might be important cross-country differences which we study next. Specifically, Table 6 
presents results using regression equation (2) where we interact the Islamic bank dummy with 
country dummies to thus explore whether the differences between conventional and Islamic 
banks vary across our 22 countries. As we interact the Islamic bank dummy with all 22 country 
dummies, we drop the Islamic bank dummy itself. For some regressions, the interaction term 
with Islamic bank dummy is not reported for all countries, as observations might be missing for 
this specific dependent variable.  
The results in Table 6 show a large cross-country variation in the differences between 
Islamic and conventional banks. The fact that the Islamic bank dummy entered insignificantly in 
most regressions of Tables 3 and 4 can be explained with the fact that it enters with opposite 
signs across different countries in Table 6. Take the example of fee income; the Table 6 results 
suggest that Islamic banks in Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Tunisia 
and Turkey have lower fee income than conventional banks in these countries, while they have 
higher fee income in Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania and Yemen. On the other hand, few 
interactions of the Islamic bank dummy with country dummies enter significantly in the 
regression of non-deposit funding. The positive and significant coefficient on the Islamic bank 
                                                          
11
 In unreported robustness tests, we also split the sample of conventional banks in large, mid-sized and small banks 
and re-run the Table 5 specification.  We find qualitatively similar results. We also dropped banks where both parent 
and subsidiary are in the sample and one of them is classified as large and the other as small and confirm our 
findings.  
22 
 
dummy in the loan-deposit ratio regression of Tables 3 and 4 is driven by Bahrain, Mauritania, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Tunisia, UK and Yemen. The interaction of the Islamic bank dummy 
with country dummies is insignificant for all other countries in the sample. There is a large 
variation in the differences between Islamic and conventional banks in cost efficiency across our 
sample countries, with Islamic banks having higher cost-income ratios in Bahrain, Gambia, 
Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritania, UAE and Yemen, while having lower cost-income 
ratios in Cayman Islands, Pakistan, Syria and Tunisia. The overhead cost regression shows 
similar cross-country variation, though not always consistent with differences in cost-income 
ratios, as most obvious in the case of Gambia, where Islamic banks have higher cost-income 
ratios but lower overhead costs than conventional banks. The difference in asset quality between 
Islamic and conventional banks again varies across countries; though in most cases Islamic 
banks show higher asset quality, the differences are mostly not significant. Where the differences 
in maturity mismatch between Islamic and conventional banks are significant, Islamic banks are 
mostly more liquid, with the exception of Kuwait and Turkey where they are significantly less 
liquid. The differences in Z-scores between Islamic and conventional banks are significant in few 
countries, while Islamic banks are less profitable than conventional banks in most countries, 
though often not significantly so. On the other hand, Islamic banks are mostly better capitalized 
than conventional banks, with the notable exceptions of Egypt, Gambia, Malaysia, and Turkey 
where they are significantly less capitalized than conventional banks.    
In summary, the differences between Islamic and conventional banks vary significantly 
across countries, though some general trends identified in the previous tables are confirmed; 
nonetheless, the higher loan-deposit ratios, lower cost efficiency, higher asset quality and higher 
capitalization are driven by the differences in some of the sample countries and are not consistent 
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across the whole sample.  In the next part, we therefore explore whether some of these cross-
country differences are driven by different market shares of Islamic banks.  
The results in Table 7 show significant variation in the differences between conventional 
and Islamic banks across countries and years with different market shares of Islamic banks. One 
of the reasons why we observe the large cross-country variation in differences between 
conventional and Islamic banks might be different relative market shares of conventional and 
Islamic banks. Higher market shares for Islamic banks might indicate more established Sharia-
compliant finance with repercussions for efficiency and regulatory approach but also for 
competitive responses by conventional banks.  In Panel A, we introduce an interaction term 
between the market share of Islamic banks and the Islamic bank dummy. As we also include 
country-year dummies, we cannot include the Islamic bank share by itself. In Panel B, we 
replace the Islamic bank dummy with two interaction terms of the bank dummy with dummies 
indicating country-year pairs with the Islamic bank share above and below the median market 
share of Islamic banks. While the Panel A results allow us to gauge the continuous variation of 
differences between Islamic and conventional banks with different market shares of Islamic 
banks, Panel B allows us a direct comparison between countries and years with high and with 
low market shares of Islamic banks.    
The Panel A regressions of Table 7 show that Islamic banks have relatively lower loan 
loss reserves and non-performing loans than conventional banks in countries and years with a 
higher market share of Islamic banks. While Islamic banks have higher equity-asset ratios than 
conventional banks, this difference decreases as the market share of Islamic banks increases 
(significant at the 10% level). We continue to find that Islamic banks have higher loan-deposit 
ratios, higher cost-income ratios and higher overhead costs than conventional banks although 
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these differences do not vary significantly with the market share of Islamic banks. The Panel B 
results suggest that the lower cost efficiency of Islamic banks vis-a-vis conventional banks is 
driven by markets with higher market shares of Islamic banks, as the Islamic bank dummy only 
enters significantly for these markets and is significantly higher than the Islamic bank dummy in 
markets with below-median Islamic bank market share. We also find that Islamic banks have 
lower loan loss reserves and non-performing loans only in markets with above-median Islamic 
bank market shares (though not significantly different from markets with below-median Islamic 
bank market shares in the case of loan loss reserves), while the higher loan deposit ratio holds 
only for Islamic banks in markets with below-median Islamic bank market shares (though the 
difference between markets above and below markets is not significant). In summary, some of 
the cross-country variation in the differences between Islamic and conventional banks, 
established in Table 6, can be explained with differences in market shares for Islamic banks.  
 
5. Islamic and conventional banks during crisis periods 
 This section compares the relative performance of conventional and Islamic banks during 
crisis periods to test whether one bank type is better positioned to withstand large exogenous 
financial shocks.  Unlike in the previous section, we focus on indicators of asset quality and 
stability since they are more likely to be affected by contagion effects than the business 
orientation and efficiency of financial institutions. In addition we report results of the loan-
deposit ratio regression to gauge (dis-)intermediation trends across conventional and Islamic 
banks during crises. We first use the previous sample to test for differential performance of 
Islamic banks during local crises and the global financial crisis that started in 2007. In our 
sample, Indonesia between 1997 and 2001, Malaysia between 1997 and 1999, Turkey in 
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2000/2001, and Yemen in 1996 suffered banking crises.   In addition, we consider quarterly 
stock market indicators for a sub-sample of listed banks over the period 2005 to 2009
12
, thus the 
period leading up and during the global crisis as well as the early recovery period.    Using 
regression equation (3), we test for additional significant differences between conventional and 
Islamic banks during local and global crises while at the same time controlling for a trend to 
avoid confounding the effect of crisis periods with trend-driven divergence between 
conventional and Islamic banks.    
 The Table 8 results show that the higher capitalization of Islamic banks relative to 
conventional banks is even stronger during local crisis periods, though it was not higher during 
the global financial crisis. On the other hand, we find a negative trend in capitalization of Islamic 
relative to conventional banks. As before, we do not find any significant difference between 
conventional and Islamic banks in their Z-scores, profitability or maturity mis-match, neither in 
normal times, during local crises or the global financial crisis. However, we find a higher loan-
deposit ratio for Islamic banks than for conventional banks and the difference increases 
significantly during local crises, which suggests that Islamic banks cut back less on lending than 
conventional banks. Turning to asset quality, finally, we find that Islamic banks have 
significantly lower non-performing loans and loan loss provisions during local crises, though not 
in normal times. In addition, the gap between Islamic and conventional banks‟ NPL ratio seemed 
to have opened up further during the global crisis though this effect is only significant at the 10% 
level. In summary, Islamic banks are better capitalized, especially during crises, have higher 
asset quality during crises and are less likely to disintermediate during crises. In robustness tests, 
                                                          
12
 We start our sample in 2005 because stock return data for Islamic banks are not extensively populated before this 
date. 
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reported in Table A3 we re-ran the regression for a sample of local banks.  Specifically, in the 
absence of detailed data on foreign activities and ownership of each of our sample banks we 
define local banks as banks whose ROA correlation with world GDP growth is less than the 
median (15%) and whose ROA correlation with host country‟s GDP growth is above the median 
(11%). This leaves us with a sample of 380 banks, of which 65 are Islamic. When using this 
sample of local banks, our results on differences between Islamic and conventional banks during 
normal and crisis times are broadly confirmed.  
 As additional test of different performance of conventional and Islamic banks we gauge 
their relative stock market performance over the period 2005 to 2009, with data from 
Datastream. Since we can only work with listed banks, our sample is reduced to 207 banks in 21 
countries.  Appendix Table A4 provides descriptive statistics on our sample and shows that our 
sample is not too different from our main sample. However, we also find a large variation in 
stability and asset quality.  The quarterly stock returns vary from -44% to 72% (over the course 
of a quarter), with a mean of 2.9%. Figure 1 shows the development of quarterly stock returns of 
both conventional and Islamic banks between Q1-2005 and Q4-2009 and shows a close co-
movement between the two bank types.  
 The Table 9 results show that while Islamic banks yield lower stock returns for their 
investors in general, the reverse held during the crisis. Here, we regress quarterly stock returns 
on an Islamic Bank dummy plus interactions with Crisis (Q4-2007 to Q4-2008) and recovery 
period (Q1 to Q4-2009). In column (2), we also include additional bank characteristics that might 
explain the behavior of stock returns, while in column (3), we add interactions of these bank 
characteristics with the crisis and recovery dummies. Controlling for other bank characteristics 
turns the Islamic bank dummy insignificant, while its interaction with Crisis still enters 
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positively, although only at the 10% significance level. The column (3) results confirm this 
finding and also show that better capitalization, and lower loan loss provisions can explain 
higher stock returns of Islamic banks in comparison with conventional banks. These effects can 
thus explain why the Islamic bank dummy and its interaction with crisis and recovery turn 
insignificant once we control for loan loss provisions, non-deposit funding and capitalization and 
its interaction with crisis.  
Together, the results in Tables 8 and 9 suggest that Islamic banks have higher asset 
quality than conventional banks during banking crises, as well as higher equity-asset ratios, 
which might explain that they are less subject to disintermediation and deleveraging as often 
observed in conventional banks.  The higher capitalization and the higher asset quality can also 
explain the better stock market performance of Islamic banks during the recent global financial 
crisis.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 This paper empirically analyzes the differences in business orientation, efficiency, asset 
quality, and stability of Islamic and conventional banks across a sample of countries with both 
types of institutions. While theory suggests significant repercussions of the equity-like nature of 
Islamic banking for business orientation, efficiency, risk-taking, and stability, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that Islamic banks‟ business model might not be too different from that of the 
conventional banks.  
 Our empirical estimations show few significant differences in business models. However, 
we find that Islamic banks are less efficient, but have higher intermediation ratios, have higher 
asset quality, and are better capitalized than conventional banks. We also find that Islamic banks 
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perform better during crises in terms of capitalization and asset quality and are less likely to 
disintermediate than conventional banks. Furthermore, our results show that this higher 
capitalization and better asset quality have helped Islamic banks outperform conventional banks 
during the latest crisis. Behind these cross-country, cross-bank results, however, are important 
variations across countries and across Islamic banks of different sizes that require further 
analysis.   
We hope that the discussion and the analysis in this paper stimulate more research in this 
area since much work remains for future research. First, disaggregated data on specific products 
and business lines are necessary to better understand the differences in financial service 
provision between conventional and Islamic banks. This would also allow us to include Islamic 
windows in our analysis, i.e. conventional banks that offer Sharia-compliant products. Second, 
future work can also assess the impact of growth of Islamic banks on the outreach of the banking 
system and ultimately the access to and use of banking products by firms and enterprises.   
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Figure 1. Average bank stock return by bank type, 2005-2009 
 
 
 
This graph shows the average stock return of Islamic and conventional banks across 21 countries 
hosting both types of banks over the period 2005 to 2009. The data are from Datastream. 
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Table 1. Banking sector structure in sample countries  
 
In this table we report the number of conventional and Islamic banks of the 22 sample countries in Bankscope that host both Islamic banks and 
conventional banks.  The sample is restricted to countries that have at least 4 banks with at least two years of observations reporting to Bankscope. In 
the last column of the table we report the market share of Islamic banking in 2007 in percentage of total banking sector assets. Data on systemic 
banking crises are from Laeven and Valencia (2010). 
 
 Conventional Islamic
Dates of systemic 
banking crises Islamic Banking %
2007 Conventional Islamic
Brahain 11 15 27.68 5 4
Bangladesh 28 5 13.22 22 5
Cayman Islands 11 1 6.53 0 0
Egypt 23 2 4.22 13 2
Gambia 5 1 8.48 0 1
Indonesia 53 1 1997-2001 0.62 24 0
Jordan 7 2 6.20 7 1
Kuwait 5 6 41.33 5 6
Lebanon 27 2 0.33 3 0
Malaysia 29 12 1997-1999 7.26 3 0
Mauritannia 5 1 12.40 0 0
Pakistan 23 10 6.72 21 6
Qatar 7 4 14.02 5 3
Saudi Arabia 9 2 5.92 8 1
Singapore 12 1 0.17 3 0
Sudan 13 9 33.84 7 4
Syria 8 1 1.05 6 1
Tunisia 14 1 1.51 10 0
Turkey 24 3 2000-2001 2.96 12 2
United Arabe Emirates 16 4 12.86 12 4
United Kingdom 88 2 2007- 0.01 0 1
Yemen 4 3 1996 51.45 0 0
Total 422 88 9.87 166 41
Listed Banks 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics   
 
In this table we report descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis. We also report p-values for the two-sided t-test of difference in 
means between Islamic and conventional banks.  All balance sheet data are from Bankscope, are yearly and cover the period 1995-2009. There are 
510 banks of which 88 are Islamic banks. We include countries that have at least 4 banks reporting to Bankscope and banks with at least 2 years of 
observations. Balance sheets data are unconsolidated when available and consolidated otherwise.  All variables are winsorized within country at the 
1% and 99% level to remove outliers.   
 
  
 Scaled by
Nber. of 
obs. Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum Islamic Banks 
Conventional 
Banks
Difference t-
test p-value 
(*)
Fee income % Total operational income 3460 33.373 19.751 5.659 68.231 35.679 33.139 0.045
Non-deposit funding % Total funding 6261 2.217 4.582 0.000 13.927 2.940 2.129 0.000
Loans deposits ratio % 6206 62.512 29.296 17.769 110.621 72.468 61.301 0.000
Cost income ratio 5817 57.086 41.867 1.040 714.290 62.860 56.298 0.002
Overheads % Total assets 6013 2.311 1.327 0.785 4.972 2.743 2.250 0.000
Loan Loss reserves % Total gross loans 5090 7.569 9.609 -0.200 80.450 6.381 7.698 0.003
Loan loss provisions % Total gross loans  4959 1.286 1.328 -0.010 4.145 1.248 1.291 0.456
Non-performing loans % Total gross loans 3385 9.283 9.320 0.644 29.345 6.344 9.575 0.000
Maturity match % 6354 48.863 56.223 0.020 891.510 50.825 48.622 0.382
Zscore 3403 29.289 22.608 3.891 75.232 26.943 29.563 0.041
Return on assets % 6360 1.246 3.758 -40.200 30.180 1.878 1.162 0.000
Equity assets ratio % 6496 11.886 7.278 3.940 27.130 16.050 11.341 0.000
Control variables
ln(total assets) 6496 13.716 1.780 7.699 20.527 13.243 13.778 0.000
Non-loan earnings assets % Total earnings assets 6356 40.324 20.856 12.228 76.746 33.442 41.205 0.000
Fixed assets % Total assets 6201 1.846 3.413 0.000 70.798 3.325 1.645 0.000
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Table 3. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks  
 
In this table we report ordinary least squares estimates of balance sheet differences between Islamic and conventional banks in 22 countries that host 
both types of banks.  All regressions include country-year fixed effects. The standard errors clustered by bank are reported in parentheses. See Table 
2 for a detailed definition of all the variables used in the regression. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 510 banks among which 88 are Islamic 
banks.  The sample period is 1995-2009.  *** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fee income
Non- 
deposit 
funding
Loans 
deposit 
ratio
Cost 
income 
ratio Overheads
Loss 
reserves
Loan loss 
provisions
Non-
performing 
loans
Maturity 
match Zscore
Return on 
assets
Equity 
assets 
ratio
Islamic bank dummy -3.727 -0.272 8.864*** 9.871*** 0.330** -1.121 -0.0891 -2.228** -3.071 -2.439 -0.111 2.898***
(2.715) (0.421) (2.648) (3.207) (0.132) (0.973) (0.103) (1.093) (5.192) (2.593) (0.251) (0.781)
Constant 35.19*** 5.266*** 66.45*** 37.05*** 1.250*** 9.499*** 0.560** 6.336*** 56.94*** 39.33*** 2.009*** 16.57***
(6.742) (1.767) (7.086) (6.015) (0.181) (2.193) (0.263) (1.678) (11.81) (9.137) (0.335) (2.120)
Observations 3,460 6,261 6,206 5,817 6,013 5,090 4,959 3,385 6,354 3,403 6,360 6,496
R-squared 0.312 0.397 0.306 0.172 0.390 0.294 0.282 0.321 0.129 0.214 0.199 0.227
Business model Efficiency Asset quality Stability
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Table 4. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks - controlling for bank characteristics 
 
In this table we report estimates of balance sheet differences between Islamic and conventional banks in 22 countries that host both types of banks.  
All regressions include country-year fixed effects. The standard errors clustered by bank are reported in parentheses. See Table 2 for a detailed 
definition of all the variables used in the regression. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 510 banks among which 88 are Islamic banks.  The sample 
period is 1995-2009.  *** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 10% level. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fee income
Non- 
deposit 
funding
Loans 
deposit ratio
Cost income 
ratio Overheads
Loss 
reserves
Loan loss 
provisions
Non-
performing 
loans
Maturity 
match Zscore
Return on 
assets
Equity 
assets ratio
Islamic bank dummy -3.090 -0.231 3.487** 6.520** 0.0559 -1.235 -0.0979 -2.129* 0.528 -2.193 -0.0476 1.193*
(2.715) (0.417) (1.648) (3.245) (0.110) (0.871) (0.101) (1.088) (3.742) (2.614) (0.198) (0.638)
ln(total assets) 0.402 -0.0161 -0.627 -1.756** -0.175*** -0.919*** 0.00250 -0.396 -6.322*** -0.383 -0.222*** -2.174***
(0.568) (0.0684) (0.427) (0.827) (0.0243) (0.211) (0.0227) (0.241) (0.944) (0.710) (0.0497) (0.133)
Non-loan earnings assets 0.0172 -0.00317 -1.030*** 0.0498 -0.00775*** 0.0726*** 0.00428* 0.0387** 0.970*** 0.0779* 0.00916** -0.00293
(0.0396) (0.00694) (0.0326) (0.0546) (0.00204) (0.0175) (0.00239) (0.0179) (0.0773) (0.0429) (0.00361) (0.0122)
Fixed assets 0.198 -0.0297* -1.104*** 1.457 0.0666*** 0.0170 0.0263** 0.189 0.0799 0.499* -0.0405 0.244***
(0.214) (0.0167) (0.140) (0.913) (0.0242) (0.162) (0.0118) (0.153) (0.235) (0.256) (0.0570) (0.0766)
Constant 28.63*** 5.643*** 123.9*** 57.64*** 3.903*** 18.31*** 0.315 9.559** 97.00*** 24.84** 4.574*** 46.10***
(9.917) (2.091) (7.557) (13.10) (0.407) (3.670) (0.424) (3.768) (16.71) (11.97) (0.765) (2.563)
Observations 3,269 5,940 5,971 5,500 5,663 4,984 4,855 3,341 6,004 3,228 5,965 6,089
R-squared 0.330 0.417 0.672 0.189 0.469 0.327 0.293 0.325 0.296 0.227 0.221 0.436
Business model Efficiency Asset quality Stability
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Table 5. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks across different size groups 
 
 
 
In this table we report estimates of balance sheet differences between Islamic and conventional banks in 22 countries that host both types of banks 
conditional on bank size among Islamic banks.  Specifically, large banks have total assets above the 75
th
 percentile, medium banks have total assets 
between the 25
th
 percentile and 75
th
 percentile and small banks have total assets below the 25
th
 percentile. All regressions include country-year fixed 
effects and bank-level controls as in Table 4. The standard errors clustered by bank are reported in parentheses. See Table 2 for a detailed definition 
of all the variables used in the regression. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 510 banks among which 88 are Islamic banks.  The sample period is 
1995-2009.  *** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 10% level.  
Fee income 
Non-
deposit 
funding 
Loans 
deposit 
ratio
Cost 
income 
ratio Overheads 
Loss 
reserves 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Maturity 
match Zscore 
Return on 
assets 
Equity 
assets ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Large bank*Islamic bank dummy -0.395 -1.011* -0.517 13.00** 0.115 -0.656 0.133 0.440 -2.104 -3.259 -0.256 0.442
(2.985) (0.606) (2.263) (5.623) (0.139) (0.614) (0.139) (1.284) (4.740) (4.291) (0.275) (1.219)
(2) Medium bank*Islamic bank dummy -4.712 -0.278 4.048** 4.288 -0.0926 -1.048 -0.183 -2.919** -4.433 -3.613 -0.187 0.444
(2.955) (0.475) (1.996) (3.877) (0.132) (1.234) (0.139) (1.480) (5.146) (3.036) (0.252) (0.686)
(3) Small bank*Islamic bank dummy -1.689 0.869 7.179** 2.793 0.318 -3.457 -0.262 -9.058*** 15.89** 7.393 0.529 3.825***
(6.561) (0.936) (3.400) (6.922) (0.201) (3.028) (0.192) (1.238) (7.972) (5.220) (0.540) (1.029)
P-value test (1)=(3) 0.86 0.09 0.05 0.25 0.39 0.35 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.03
Number of observations 3,269 5,940 5,971 5,500 5,663 4,984 4,855 3,341 6,004 3,228 5,965 6,089
R-squared 0.330 0.419 0.673 0.190 0.471 0.328 0.294 0.331 0.299 0.229 0.222 0.440
Business model Efficiency Asset quality Stability 
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Table 6. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks, testing for cross-country variation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fee income
Non- 
deposit 
funding
Loans 
deposit 
ratio
Cost 
income 
ratio Overheads
Loss 
reserves
Loan loss 
provisions
Non-
performing 
loans
Maturity 
match Zscore
Return on 
assets
Equity 
assets ratio
Brahain 1.401 0.124 11.57*** 10.86* 1.022*** -0.866 0.472** -1.825 20.95* -15.89 1.314 3.578**
(5.320) (1.319) (4.437) (5.638) (0.358) (3.004) (0.226) (3.847) (12.48) (10.31) (0.816) (1.797)
Bangladesh -12.82 -2.154*** -3.504 -1.437 -0.626*** -1.676 -0.140 -3.037 -1.277 -2.995 -0.962 -1.415
(8.203) (0.808) (2.998) (15.74) (0.143) (1.069) (0.195) (2.683) (8.613) (6.111) (0.756) (1.154)
Cayman Islands -14.60*** -0.478 -1.163 1.796*** 55.45*** 1.495*** 14.95***
(5.359) (0.323) (2.028) (0.428) (7.239) (0.510) (1.340)
Egypt -9.516*** -0.0694 -0.858 -0.0831 -0.757*** 0.342 -0.0232 -7.259 -9.979 0.0884 -0.491** -4.175***
(3.609) (0.318) (3.298) (7.321) (0.0889) (3.375) (0.762) (4.928) (11.87) (4.709) (0.232) (0.592)
Gambia 3.068 -1.473 1.254 90.65*** -0.289* -0.237 0.411*** -13.71 3.603** -6.425*** -7.541***
(2.155) (1.022) (2.081) (3.300) (0.155) (2.348) (0.110) (10.40) (1.794) (1.599) (2.098)
Indonesia -4.971** -0.387* 6.511 8.124** 0.960*** -1.446* -0.0757 -2.455 6.657 -8.145* 0.00335 -0.582
(2.381) (0.205) (4.384) (3.474) (0.170) (0.814) (0.214) (1.935) (7.114) (4.891) (0.286) (2.781)
Jordan -10.12*** -1.075 -2.523 -2.488 -1.083*** -5.944** -0.226 -5.851** -5.506 1.112 -0.530** -1.241
(2.465) (2.157) (6.444) (5.662) (0.194) (2.738) (0.247) (2.306) (8.234) (8.838) (0.229) (2.538)
Kuwait 33.01*** -4.773* 4.450 35.63** 1.401** 1.416 0.369 3.050 -11.85* -12.83 1.865* 4.602***
(7.797) (2.764) (6.574) (17.58) (0.607) (3.219) (0.235) (3.951) (6.744) (8.443) (1.090) (1.494)
Lebanon 47.20*** 0.0815 6.309 22.03 2.206*** 25.86** 0.602 74.23*** -7.951 -1.628 9.785***
(4.806) (0.227) (11.55) (17.51) (0.328) (10.10) (0.512) (7.043) (5.912) (1.526) (2.031)
Malaysia 2.303 0.0947 0.843 14.00*** 0.198 -0.789 0.390* 1.749 -11.02* -7.232 -1.270*** -3.227***
(6.977) (0.0900) (4.842) (3.781) (0.202) (0.672) (0.215) (1.757) (6.232) (4.926) (0.315) (1.240)
Mauritannia 20.32*** 0.0250 8.921** 17.33** 0.309* -2.944*** 1.018 28.88*** -0.282 5.314***
(6.149) (0.0357) (4.329) (6.730) (0.183) (0.0561) (7.123) (5.208) (0.304) (1.811)
Pakistan 6.006 0.0437 3.895 -26.52** -0.630** -4.871** -0.857** -5.441 4.920 -1.587 1.007 2.728*
(5.929) (0.516) (3.063) (12.96) (0.309) (2.268) (0.337) (3.446) (8.692) (6.044) (0.624) (1.410)
Qatar -6.732 -0.846 -1.515 -0.0477 -0.0313 -0.431 -0.258 -6.080** -42.16 -8.679 1.265*** -1.826
(4.296) (0.562) (7.306) (2.374) (0.254) (2.822) (0.260) (3.073) (35.34) (9.996) (0.437) (2.000)
Saudi Arabia -15.75* 0.406 11.56*** 7.806 0.265 -1.074 0.0358 -1.192 38.18 28.69 -0.176 8.424**
(8.906) (0.380) (1.098) (9.678) (0.521) (1.100) (0.442) (0.833) (38.12) (17.64) (0.924) (3.459)
Singapore -33.54** 1.441 22.52** 7.961 -0.447 -3.296*** 1.093*** 60.46*** -2.267*** 6.746***
(17.05) (1.509) (9.620) (9.743) (0.430) (0.960) (0.243) (7.139) (0.328) (1.558)
Business model Efficiency Asset quality Stability
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Table 6. Continued 
 
 
In this table we report estimates of balance sheet differences between Islamic and conventional banks in 22 countries that host both types of banks.  
All regressions include country-year fixed effects. The coefficients reported are estimates for interactions of Islamic bank dummies with host country 
dummy. The standard errors clustered by bank are reported in parentheses. See Table 2 for a detailed definition of all the variables used in the 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fee income
Non- 
deposit 
funding
Loans 
deposit 
ratio
Cost 
income 
ratio Overheads
Loss 
reserves
Loan loss 
provisions
Non-
performing 
loans
Maturity 
match Zscore
Return on 
assets
Equity 
assets ratio
Sudan -13.84** -1.850 2.607 11.60 0.301 0.862 -0.335 -3.111 -6.749 4.159 -0.369 0.588
(6.895) (2.024) (9.159) (10.62) (0.254) (1.951) (0.454) (2.036) (13.35) (3.033) (0.509) (1.691)
Syria -1.748 -0.482 -31.63** -0.390*** 9.582*** 64.43*** -1.584*** 8.007***
(1.108) (5.916) (16.09) (0.132) (0.295) (7.058) (0.383) (2.457)
Tunisia -5.879*** 2.962*** 8.676*** -17.44*** -1.075*** -8.321** -0.610*** -5.181 21.44*** 0.211 10.15***
(0.532) (0.157) (2.522) (5.004) (0.156) (3.272) (0.196) (3.707) (3.142) (0.214) (1.460)
Turkey -18.39*** 0.422 -1.397 -4.054 -0.606* 0.314 0.125 1.359 -30.71** 0.959 -2.807***
(6.876) (2.093) (5.331) (8.322) (0.368) (1.445) (0.332) (2.025) (14.51) (0.628) (0.963)
United Arabe Emirates 2.003 -0.667 0.882 24.39** 0.378 0.639 -0.266 1.980 -2.571 -13.83*** -0.976 -0.142
(6.029) (0.611) (3.121) (10.79) (0.291) (3.369) (0.180) (3.997) (4.051) (4.965) (0.664) (1.807)
United Kingdom -1.851*** 16.30*** 3.142*** 1.024 83.61*** -3.351** 13.78***
(0.533) (3.196) (0.176) (3.124) (29.55) (1.466) (0.956)
Yemen 33.46*** 10.29*** 18.92* 11.91* -0.160 -15.97*** -0.909 -18.38*** 31.51*** -1.975 0.391 4.566**
(7.393) (2.091) (10.44) (6.252) (0.382) (3.660) (0.721) (2.010) (4.940) (5.500) (0.508) (1.967)
ln(total assets) 0.669 -0.00698 -0.559 -1.696** -0.166*** -0.896*** 0.00307 -0.369 -6.081*** -0.431 -0.213*** -2.121***
(0.564) (0.0672) (0.437) (0.804) (0.0233) (0.212) (0.0226) (0.242) (0.942) (0.715) (0.0488) (0.132)
Non-loan earnings assets 0.0163 -0.000255 -1.026*** 0.0607 -0.00773*** 0.0671*** 0.00412* 0.0317* 0.973*** 0.0723* 0.00931** -0.00514
(0.0387) (0.00671) (0.0329) (0.0544) (0.00203) (0.0176) (0.00239) (0.0180) (0.0744) (0.0431) (0.00369) (0.0124)
Fixed assets 0.137 -0.0181 -1.108*** 1.627** 0.0661*** -0.0831 0.0220* 0.175 0.00821 0.513** -0.0492 0.221***
(0.209) (0.0181) (0.144) (0.782) (0.0193) (0.146) (0.0122) (0.149) (0.247) (0.241) (0.0554) (0.0746)
Constant 23.39** 5.260** 120.1*** 54.74*** 3.464*** 18.23*** 0.0913 9.438** 86.91*** 33.16** 3.917*** 44.71***
(9.724) (2.112) (8.251) (13.06) (0.470) (3.903) (0.397) (3.899) (16.03) (14.42) (0.812) (2.615)
Observations 3,269 5,940 5,971 5,500 5,663 4,984 4,855 3,341 6,004 3,228 5,965 6,089
R-squared 0.356 0.444 0.675 0.202 0.498 0.349 0.303 0.340 0.312 0.247 0.230 0.462
Business model Efficiency Asset quality Stability
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regression. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 510 banks among which 88 are Islamic banks.  The sample period is 1995-2009.  *** Significance 
at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 7. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks – controlling for market shares 
 
 
 
In this table we report estimates of balance sheet differences between Islamic and conventional banks in 22 countries that host both types of banks 
conditional on the market share of Islamic banking in the host country.  All regressions include country-year fixed effects. The standard errors 
clustered by bank are reported in parentheses. See Table 2 for a detailed definition of all the variables used in the regression. The sample is an 
unbalanced panel of 510 banks among which 88 are Islamic banks.  The sample period is 1995-2009.  In panel A we include the interaction of the 
Islamic bank dummy with the market share of Islamic banking in the host country. In panel B we split the countries into two groups: a group of 
countries with a high Islamic banking share (above the median) and a group of countries with a low Islamic banking share (below the median). *** 
Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 10% level. 
Fee 
income 
Non-
deposit 
funding 
Loans 
deposit 
ratio
Cost 
income 
ratio Overheads 
Loss 
reserves 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Maturity 
match Zscore 
Return on 
assets 
Equity 
assets 
ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. 
Islamic bank dummy -1.303 -0.320 8.670*** 8.138* 0.290* 0.267 -0.0781 -0.08 -2.618 -2.842 -0.097 3.681***
(3.339) (0.442) (3.084) (4.253) (0.162) (1.206) (0.129) (1.305) (5.404) (3.450) (0.266) (1.009)
Islamic banking share*Islamic bank dummy -0.143 0.003 0.011 0.093 0.002 -0.087** -0.001 -0.158** -0.0251 0.021 -0.001 -0.044*
(0.113) (0.025) (0.128) (0.132) (0.004) (0.042) (0.005) (0.063) (0.123) (0.073) (0.007) -0.024
Bank level controls no no no no no no no no no no no no
Number of observations 3,460 6,261 6,206 5,817 6,013 5,090 4,959 3,385 6,354 3,403 6,360 6,496
R-squared 0.314 0.397 0.306 0.172 0.390 0.297 0.282 0.324 0.129 0.214 0.199 0.229
Panel B.
(1) High Islamic banking share*Islamic bank dummy -3.907 -0.331 3.109 10.33*** 0.171 -1.960** -0.127 -2.937** -0.790 -3.259 0.00669 0.973
(3.105) (0.529) (2.082) (3.801) (0.120) (0.991) (0.104) (1.225) (4.465) (3.008) (0.242) (0.655)
(2) Low Islamic banking share*Islamic bank dummy -1.024 0.0156 4.427** -3.458 -0.250 0.698 -0.0270 0.617 3.807 1.999 -0.190 1.761
(4.912) (0.432) (1.780) (4.046) (0.191) (1.754) (0.213) (1.259) (5.707) (4.682) (0.221) (1.301)
test p-value (1)=(2) 0.61 0.58 0.59 0.01 0.05 0.19 0.66 0.03 0.49 0.34 0.49 0.56
Bank level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 3,269 5,940 5,971 5,500 5,663 4,984 4,855 3,341 6,004 3,228 5,965 6,089
R-squared 0.330 0.417 0.672 0.191 0.471 0.328 0.293 0.327 0.297 0.228 0.221 0.436
Business model Efficiency Asset quality Stability 
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Table 8. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks during crises 
 
 
 
In this table we report estimates of balance sheet differences between Islamic and conventional banks in 22 countries that host both types of banks.  
All regressions include country-year fixed effects. Local crises is a dummy that takes value one during years when the bank host country is 
experiencing a systemic banking crisis (see Table 1). Global crisis is a dummy that takes value 1 in 2007-2009. Trend is a linear trend. The standard 
errors clustered by bank are reported in parentheses. See Table 2 for a detailed definition of all the variables used in the regression. The sample is an 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Return on 
assets
Equity assets 
ratio Zscore
Loans 
deposit ratio
Maturity 
match
Non-
performing 
loans
Loss 
reserves
Loss 
provisions
Islamic bank dummy 0.407 2.820*** -2.453 4.134* 3.748 -2.412 -1.394 0.0557
(0.354) (0.805) (5.161) (2.254) (5.500) (1.506) (1.410) (0.141)
Islamic bank dummy*Local crises -0.726 6.717*** 12.86* 12.36** 40.18* -8.605** -3.231 -1.000**
(0.752) (2.144) (7.640) (6.262) (20.59) (3.777) (2.115) (0.412)
Islamic bank dummy*Global crisis -0.189 -0.152 2.447 0.344 2.912 -2.591* 0.790 0.211
(0.346) (0.883) (3.802) (2.691) (6.303) (1.494) (1.294) (0.169)
Islamic bank dummy*Trend -0.0705 -0.317*** -0.0847 -0.187 -0.909 0.242 -0.00451 -0.0351*
(0.0490) (0.101) (0.522) (0.319) (0.954) (0.233) (0.149) (0.0193)
ln(total assets) -0.215*** -2.142*** -0.381 -0.605 -6.225*** -0.411* -0.920*** 0.00603
(0.0496) (0.134) (0.712) (0.430) (0.940) (0.243) (0.212) (0.0227)
Non-loan earnings assets 0.00933** -0.00293 0.0769* -1.031*** 0.967*** 0.0397** 0.0724*** 0.00424*
(0.00362) (0.0123) (0.0431) (0.0327) (0.0770) (0.0180) (0.0175) (0.00238)
Fixed assets -0.0403 0.245*** 0.487* -1.104*** 0.0817 0.194 0.0152 0.0268**
(0.0559) (0.0788) (0.255) (0.140) (0.233) (0.154) (0.162) (0.0119)
Constant 4.327*** 45.23*** 24.05** 123.4*** 95.05*** 9.728** 18.40*** 0.221
(0.754) (2.572) (12.14) (7.646) (16.50) (3.845) (3.753) (0.420)
Observations 5,965 6,089 3,228 5,971 6,004 3,341 4,984 4,855
R-squared 0.222 0.441 0.227 0.672 0.298 0.328 0.327 0.295
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unbalanced panel of 510 banks among which 88 are Islamic banks.  The sample period is 1995-2009.  *** Significance at the 1% level, ** 
Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 9. Islamic versus conventional banks: Stock market performance during the crisis 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
(1) Islamic bank dummy -3.319** -1.154 1.704
[1.352] [1.301] [1.475]
(2) Islamic bank dummy*Crisis 4.951** 4.059* -2.015
[2.016] [2.174] [2.757]
(3) Islamic bank dummy*Recovery 1.17 -0.613 -2.888
[1.684] [1.852] [2.190]
Maturity match 0.088*** 0.133***
[0.025] [0.048]
Maturity match*Crisis 0.038
[0.101]
Maturity match*Recovery -0.155
[0.105]
Loans-deposits ratio 0.014 0.023*
[0.008] [0.012]
Loans-deposits ratio*Crisis -0.02
[0.014]
Loans deposits ratio*Recovery 0.018
[0.017]
Provisions -0.456 3.279*
[0.575] [1.958]
Provisions*Crisis -6.443***
[2.210]
Provisions*Recovery -3.889*
[2.031]
ln(total assets) 0.37 0.813
[0.350] [0.509]
ln(total assets)*Crisis 0.243
[0.228]
ln(total assets)*Recovery -0.677
[0.876]
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Table 9. Continued 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the quarterly stock return. The sample covers 166 listed conventional banks and 41 listed 
Islamic banks in the period Q1-2005 to Q4-2009. All regressions include country-year fixed effects. Crisis is a 
dummy that takes value 1 in the period Q4-2007 to Q4-2008 and recovery is a dummy that takes value one in 2009. 
Standard errors clustered by bank are reported in brackets. See Table 2 for a definition of all variables. All control 
variables are lagged by one year (4 quarters). *** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * 
Significance at the 10% level. 
 
(1) (2) (3)
NonDepositFunding 0.03 0.274*
[0.047] [0.143]
NonDepositFunding*Crisis -0.391**
[0.153]
NonDepositFunding*Recovery -0.286*
[0.147]
Equity capital ratio -0.005 -0.045
[0.064] [0.102]
Equity capital ratio*Crisis 0.615***
[0.183]
Equity capital ratio*Recovery -0.094
[0.138]
Constant 28.630*** 20.038*** 7.156
[3.569] [7.341] [10.055]
Tests p-values 
(1)+(2)=0 0.208 0.069 0.892
(1)+(3)=0 0.085 0.211 0.452
Country*Year FE x x x
Number of observations 2016 1636 1387
R-squared 0.28 0.3 0.31
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Table A1. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks - Truncated sample 
 
 
 
In this table we report ordinary least squares regression estimates of balance sheet differences between Islamic and conventional banks in 22 
countries that host both types of banks.  All regressions include country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. See Table 2 
for a detailed definition of all the variables used in the regression. The sample is truncated to exclude outliers i.e. observations below the 1
st
 percentile 
and above the 99
th
 percentile (within country).  The sample period is 1995-2009.  *** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * 
Significance at the 10% level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fee income
Non- 
deposit 
funding
Loans 
deposit ratio
Cost 
income ratio Overheads
Loss 
reserves
Loan loss 
provisions
Non-
performing 
loans
Maturity 
match Zscore
Return on 
assets
Equity 
assets ratio
Islamic bank dummy -4.447 1.475 11.81 5.124* 0.283 -1.566** 8.538 -3.797** 0.867 0.841 0.0445 5.231***
(6.053) (1.339) (8.379) (2.711) (0.203) (0.728) (8.671) (1.474) (3.371) (6.088) (0.175) (1.839)
ln(total assets) 1.118 -0.286 -7.532*** -1.477** -0.318*** -0.703*** 0.0727 -1.342*** -5.503*** -0.513 -0.192*** -3.594***
(1.026) (0.224) (2.189) (0.710) (0.0709) (0.189) (0.162) (0.488) (0.807) (1.142) (0.0446) (0.289)
Non-loan earnings assets 0.0143 -0.0174 -1.360*** 0.0178 -0.00565* 0.0597*** 0.168 0.111* 0.797*** 0.106* 0.00415 0.0207
(0.0549) (0.0202) (0.144) (0.0439) (0.00331) (0.0140) (0.155) (0.0657) (0.0585) (0.0578) (0.00253) (0.0197)
Fixed assets 1.013 -0.0621 -2.186*** 1.439 0.319*** 0.0581 0.186 0.276 -0.0967 0.124 -0.0631 0.452***
(0.632) (0.0572) (0.517) (0.875) (0.0480) (0.148) (0.113) (0.409) (0.206) (0.484) (0.0554) (0.0871)
Constant 33.89 13.31*** 309.5*** 55.77*** 5.279*** 16.15*** -11.19 19.39*** 94.09*** 24.97 4.394*** 70.58***
(24.37) (5.120) (89.48) (11.81) (1.019) (3.344) (10.90) (7.184) (15.57) (17.95) (0.701) (7.133)
Observations 3,223 5,872 5,879 5,422 5,589 4,913 4,784 3,303 5,923 3,182 5,874 6,007
R-squared 0.169 0.286 0.179 0.213 0.423 0.356 0.067 0.226 0.329 0.191 0.213 0.385
Business model Efficiency Asset quality Stability
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Table A2. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks - 1995 to 2007 
 
In this table we report robust regression estimates of balance sheet differences between Islamic and conventional banks in 22 countries that host both 
types of banks.  All regressions include country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. See Table 2 for a detailed definition of 
all the variables used in the regression. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 510 banks among which 88 are Islamic banks.  The sample period is 
1995-2007.  *** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fee income
Non- 
deposit 
funding
Loans 
deposit ratio
Cost 
income 
ratio Overheads
Loss 
reserves
Loan loss 
provisions
Non-
performing 
loans
Maturity 
match Zscore
Return on 
assets
Equity 
assets ratio
Islamic bank dummy -2.986 -0.237 3.510** 6.179* 0.0187 -1.400 -0.153 -1.637 1.189 -2.823 0.0985 1.501**
(3.244) (0.477) (1.764) (3.470) (0.119) (0.987) (0.111) (1.272) (3.946) (2.840) (0.223) (0.691)
ln(total assets) 0.311 -0.0137 -0.892** -1.339 -0.171*** -0.963*** -0.00244 -0.355 -6.212*** -0.212 -0.260*** -2.158***
(0.574) (0.0720) (0.402) (0.885) (0.0256) (0.230) (0.0235) (0.263) (0.954) (0.744) (0.0545) (0.136)
Non-loan earnings assets -0.0173 -0.00256 -1.040*** 0.0633 -0.00736*** 0.0739*** 0.00487** 0.0432** 0.990*** 0.0776* 0.00936** -0.00154
(0.0427) (0.00749) (0.0323) (0.0563) (0.00201) (0.0190) (0.00239) (0.0199) (0.0802) (0.0461) (0.00401) (0.0128)
Fixed assets 0.167 -0.0111 -1.093*** 1.360* 0.0689*** -0.0624 0.0189 0.192 -0.0788 0.378 -0.0414 0.260***
(0.253) (0.0192) (0.148) (0.725) (0.0223) (0.170) (0.0130) (0.156) (0.258) (0.296) (0.0473) (0.0814)
Constant 31.36*** 5.564*** 127.8*** 51.77*** 3.847*** 18.99*** 0.387 8.585** 94.59*** 35.65** 5.019*** 45.70***
(10.04) (2.127) (7.260) (13.56) (0.418) (3.940) (0.439) (4.034) (16.74) (14.30) (0.808) (2.587)
Observations 2,847 5,253 5,250 4,795 4,942 4,342 4,233 2,839 5,271 2,658 5,227 5,347
R-squared 0.339 0.315 0.680 0.183 0.466 0.322 0.296 0.308 0.312 0.237 0.219 0.429
Business model Efficiency Asset quality Stability
 48 
Table A3. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks during crises - restricting the sample to local banks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Return on 
assets
Equity assets 
ratio Zscore
Loans deposit 
ratio Maturity match
Non-performing 
loans Loss reserves Loss provisions
Islamic bank dummy 0.168 2.916*** -4.808 2.909 3.681 -2.110 -1.159 -0.0367
(0.346) (0.861) (5.515) (2.386) (6.487) (1.732) (1.533) (0.149)
Islamic bank dummy*Local crises -0.848 6.682*** 15.23** 12.91** 40.54* -8.268** -3.259 -0.792*
(0.749) (2.393) (7.716) (6.313) (22.81) (3.871) (2.303) (0.441)
Islamic bank dummy*Global crisis -0.203 -0.625 2.789 1.574 -1.188 -2.871* 1.261 0.223
(0.369) (0.994) (4.313) (2.710) (7.344) (1.628) (1.432) (0.187)
Islamic bank dummy*Trend -0.0414 -0.219* 0.284 0.0166 -0.198 0.243 -0.0744 -0.0343
(0.0674) (0.129) (0.596) (0.360) (1.321) (0.296) (0.176) (0.0253)
ln(total assets) -0.224*** -2.134*** -0.130 -0.736 -6.007*** -0.318 -0.717*** 0.0171
(0.0524) (0.141) (0.787) (0.466) (1.023) (0.263) (0.197) (0.0245)
Non-loan earnings assets 0.0105*** -0.00479 0.113** -1.044*** 1.010*** 0.0334* 0.0663*** 0.00312
(0.00398) (0.0134) (0.0487) (0.0349) (0.0796) (0.0184) (0.0173) (0.00252)
Fixed assets -0.00641 0.246*** 0.622*** -1.079*** 0.0808 0.137 0.0273 0.0218
(0.0402) (0.0879) (0.221) (0.129) (0.220) (0.150) (0.153) (0.0135)
Constant 4.409*** 46.98*** 19.71 131.5*** 96.47*** 7.141* 15.77*** 0.475
(0.780) (2.645) (14.20) (8.212) (22.49) (4.325) (4.066) (0.593)
Observations 5,158 5,275 2,706 5,181 5,199 2,915 4,305 4,218
R-squared 0.228 0.449 0.230 0.672 0.302 0.350 0.345 0.297
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In this table we report estimates of balance sheet differences between Islamic and conventional banks in 22 countries that host both types of banks.  
All regressions include country-year fixed effects. Local crises in a dummy that takes value one during years when the bank host country is 
experiencing a systemic banking crisis (see Table 1). Global crisis is a dummy that takes value 1 in 2007-2009. Trend is a linear trend. The standard 
errors clustered by bank are reported in parentheses. See Table 2 for a detailed definition of all the variables used in the regression. The sample is 
restricted to 380 banks among which 65 are Islamic banks.  Local banks are defined as banks whose return on assets correlation with world GDP 
growth is less than median (15 %) and whose return on assets correlation with host country GDP growth is above median (11%). The sample period 
is 1995-2009.  *** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 10% level. 
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Table A4. Descriptive statistics - Stock return regressions 2005 to 2009 
 
 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of variables explored in the analysis of the effect of the global crisis on stock returns.  The sample covers 41 
listed Islamic banks and 166 listed conventional banks. Quarterly stock returns are from Datastream.  See Table 2 for a detailed definition of all the 
variables used in the regression.  
 
 
Number of 
observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Equity assets ratio 2148 12.499 7.044 3.650 25.480
Nondeposits funding 2107 1.773 5.421 0.000 26.742
Loans deposits ratio 2070 64.005 28.104 19.282 110.487
Maturity match 2098 40.834 25.174 7.350 87.110
Provisions 1716 1.217 1.412 -0.008 4.747
ln(total assets) 2148 14.265 1.614 10.959 16.866
Stock returns 2016 2.863 21.658 -43.652 71.592
